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COMMENTS
THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE
WILLIAM S. STJNNET=E
The recent Washington case of Gaffney v. Scott Publishing Co.,'
was the second appeal in an action for libel. In the course of the opin-
ion rendered on the first appeal,' the Court determined that the pub-
lication in question was libelous per se and, in effect, stated that truth
is the only defense to an action based on such a publication. At the
second trial, the defendants attempted to rely on the usually accepted
defense of privilege,' but that defense was stricken by the trial court.
On the second appeal, the defendants alleged this ruling to be error.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court holding
that the decision on the first appeal had established the law of the
case. In the course of the opinion, the court considered that some of
the law of libel as established in its previous decisions might be open
to question, but concluded that the law of the case doctrine prevented
it from then undertaking any such reconsideration.
A rule of law which requires a court to perpetuate its previous
errors appears to be one which would bear examination. Such a rule
is the doctrine of the law of the case. The doctrine is very similar in
purpose to that of res judicata. Both are doctrines of repose, expres-
sions of a policy of the law that the litigation of a controversy should
terminate when the parties have had their day in court. Very gen-
erally, the doctrine of res judicata is designed to.prevent further liti-
gation of a cause of action which has terminated and merged into a
final judgement. The law of the case doctrine -is designed to produce
the same result within litigation not yet carried to a final judgement.
It precludes further consideration of certain questions which have
been prosecuted to what might be ternied a final judgement, either
because the remedies provided for review of the decision of those ques-
tions have been exhausted or because those remdies have not been
pursued and have ceased to be available.
The doctrine of the law of the case does not appear to involve legal
1 Gaffney v. Scott Publishing Co., 141 Wash.-Dec. 181, 248 P. 2d 390 (1952).2 Gaffney v. Scott Publishing Co., 35 Wn. 2d 272, 212 P 2d 817 (1949).
8 PRossER, ToRTS, p. 841 (1941).
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principles of any great difficulty. The confusion which seems to exist
is probably the result of a general lack of familiarity with it. This
area of the law has received only slight attention from legal writers
and is one which has been treated in an extremely casual manner by
the courts. In a number of Washington cases, the court has applied
the law of the case doctrine to questions involved in earlier proceed-
ings in the same case entirely without citation of authority. Particu-
larly in the less frequented areas of the doctrine's application, there
appear to have been conflicting lines of decision running concurrently. '
Injecting still further confusion into the situation, the doctrine has
been treated as if it were two separate rules. The decision of an
appellate court on the first appeal, as in the Gaffney case, is said to
establish the law of the case for subsequent trials and appeals of the
same case. The other situation, and probably a more familiar applica-
tion of the doctrine, is the rule that the instructions of a trial court
establish the law of the case on an appeal from the judgment of the
trial court when exception is not taken to those instructions. ' Com-
mentators and legal encyclopedias have treated each application of
the doctrine as though it were a separate rule. For example: "The
doctrine of the law of the case applies only to rulings by an appellate
court and does not apply to rulings by the trial court."" Both applica-
tions appear to be expressions of the single principle that the ruling
or decision of any court is final and will not be reconsidered in any
subsequent proceeding in the same case unless review of that decision
or ruling is sought by means of the appropriate procedure. In the
case of a trial court, it is obvious that review is usually available, but
the principle is no less applicable to a court of last resort since a
means of review is still available, a petition for rehearing addressed
to the court itself.' The separate treatment of the two applications of
the doctrine has, however, resulted in the growth of rules with respect
to one application which do not necessarily apply to the other. For
that reason, this discussion will be confined to questions involved in
4 Manson v. Foltz, 170 Wash. 652, 17 P. 2d 616 (1932) (holding the doctrine to
apply to questions which could have been presented on the first appeal); Hamilton
v. Caldwell, 195 Wash. 683, 81 P. 2d 815 (1938) (holding the doctrine to be restricted
to questions presented and decided on the first appeal) ; Buob v. Feenaughty Ma-
chinery Co., 4 Wn. 2d 276, 103 P. 2d 325 (1940) (holding the doctrine to apply to
questions which could have been presented on the first appeal) ; Columbia Steel Co.
v. State, 34 Wn. 2d 700, 209 P. 2d 482 (1949) (holding the doctrine to be restricted
to questions presented and decided on the first appeal).
5 Peters v. Dulien Steel Products Inc., 39 Wn. 2d 889, 239 P. 2d 1055 (1952).
8 5 C.J.S. 1821, citing Lawrence v. Ballou, 37 Cal. 518 (1869).
7 Miller v. Lake Irrigation Co., 33 Wash. 132, 74 Pac. 61 (1903).
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a first appeal which are considered to establish the law of the case in
the trial court on remand and in the appellate court itself on a sub-
sequent appeal.
The problems with respect to that phase of the doctrine group
themselves into two general areas. First, it must be determined
whether or not a particular question involved in the first appeal falls
within the application of the doctrine and establishes the law of the
case for 'subsequent proceedings. Second, it must be determined what
effect those questions, as the law of the case, will have on a subsequent
'trial or appeal of the case. It is proposed to consider these two prob-
lems in that order, and primarily as they have been treated in the
Washington decisions.
THE FmsT APPEAL
The doctrine of the law of the case is most commonly applied to
prevent reconsideration of questions of law8 which have, on the first
appeal, been presentedi decided, and were necessary to the disposition
of that appeal.' The limitation of the doctrine to questions of law is
not a limitation inherent in the doctrine but is a reflection of the usual
rule that appellate courts do not determine questions of fact. In apply-
ing the doctrine to this most obvious area, however, the courts tend
to make sweeping general statements by way of dictum as to the
applicability of the doctrine to other classes of questions. These
statements indicate that the doctrine may also apply: (a) to questions
necessarily involved in the decision on the first appeal, though neither
urged upon the court nor discussed in the court's opinion; (b) to
questions not necessary to the disposition of the case on the first
appeal but urged upon the court and decided by it; (c) to questions
urged upon the court but not decided by it; (d) and to questions
neither urged upon the court nor decided by it but which could
properly have been presented on the first appeal.
Questions necessarily involved in the determination of the case on
the first appeal, though neither urged upon the court for decision nor.
discussed in the court's opinion, appear to call for the application of
the doctrine as strongly as questions both urged upon the court and
actually decided.10 As examples of this application, the power of a
s Sloan v. West, 63 Wash. 623, 116 Pac. 272 (1911).
9 Buob v. Feenaughty Machinery Co., 4 Wn. 2d 276, 103 P. 2d 325 (1940), and
cases therein cited.
10 Swick v. School District of Borough of Tarentum, 344 Pa. 197, 25 A. 2d 314
(1942) ; Elson v. Pridgen, 241 Ala. 233, 2 So. 2d 110 (1941) ; Coats v. General Motors
Corp., 11 Cal. 2d 601, 81 P. 2d 906 (1938).
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special administratrix to file the claim necessary to perfect a cause
of action against a city was held to have been necessarily involved in
the determination of the previous appeal with the result that the
filing of the claim could not be questioned on the second appeal." The
same result was reached with respect to the commencement of an
action on a policy of insurance within the time limited by the policy. 2
The question of the jurisdiction of the court, although it is always
necessarily involved, is not always treated in the same manner. A
number of cases have held that the question of jurisdiction is not fore-
closed by the first appeal where it was not there urged and con-
sidered." In a Washington case, the court not only took that position
but cast some doubt on whether it could be considered the law of the
case that the court had jurisdiction even where that question was
raised and decided on the previous appeal. In Elsom v. Tefit," the
court said: "No doubt a court of final resort has the power, and no
doubt it is its duty, to ignore or refuse to recognize a judgement which
it has pronounced without having jurisdiction of the parties to the
cause and the subject matter which it determines, . . ." That appears
to be the proper result in light of RCW 4.32.190." There is, however,
authority holding that the question of jurisdiction is to be treated no
differently than other types of questions which were necessarily in-
volved on the first appeal, a position to which the Washington court
has more recently adhered.' These two positions are not necessarily
in conflict. It is conceivable that while the doctrine may never pre-
clude questioning whether the power conferred upon the court enables
it to hear and determine the case before it, it may be applicable to
questions of jurisdictional fact, that is, the facts of the particular case
which constitute the basis for the court's jurisdiction.
Questions considered on the first appeal are usually regarded as not
establishing the law of the case where the conclusion reached was
clearly dictum.' There is some authority, however, to the effect that
" Morehouse v. City of Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 Pac. 157 (1926).
12 Moore v. National Accident Society, 49 Wash. 312, 95 Pac. 286 (1908).
13 City of Stuart v. Green, 91 F. 2d 603 (C.A. 5th 1937) ; Western Smelting and
Refining Co. v. Benj. Harris & Co., 302 Ill. App. 535, 24 N.E. 2d 255 (1939).
14 Elsom v. Tefft, 148 Wash. 195, 268 Pac. 177 (1928).
15 RCW 4.32.190 ERRS § 263] "... . excepting always the objection that the court
has no jurisdiction .... which objection can be made at any stage of the proceedings,
either in the superior or supreme court."
16 Davis v. Davis, 16 Wn. 2d 607, 134 P. 2d 467 (1943) ; Security Trust & Sav-
ings Bank v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co., 19 Cal. App. 2d 420, 65 P. 2d 818 (1937)
Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Brown, 224 Iowa 1256, 278 N.W. 294 (1938).
17 In re Norton's Estate, 177 Or. 342, 162 P. 2d 379 (1945) ; Spencer v. Nelson,
108 Cal. App. 217, 238 P. 2d 169 (1951) ; Morrison v. Dominion National Bank, 172
Va. 293, 1 S.E. 2d 292 (1939).
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even though the decision of a particular question was not necessary to
the disposition of the case on the first appeal, that decision will estab-
lish the law of the case where the question was urged upon the court
for decision. 8 The author has been unable to discover any instance
in which the Washington court has dealt with or discussed this appli-
cation of the doctrine.
There is some authority indicating that questions urged upon the
court on the first appeal but neither decided in the opinion nor neces-
sarily involved in the actual determination are presumed to have been
decided adversely; hence such questions establish the law of the case
and may not be reconsidered. 9 The doctrine has been applied to this
class of questions only infrequently, and it is probably open to ques-
tion whether, in light of the modem trends in the application of the
doctrine, it would still be so applied. More recently the Washington
court has limited the doctrine to questions actually presented and
decided on the first appeal or necessarily involved in the disposition
of that appeal.20
That position taken by the Washington court would, if adhered to,
also eliminate from the application of the doctrine the remaining area
in which it has been applied. It has been held that questions which
would have been determined on the first appeal, had they been pre-
sented, may not be considered on a subsequent appeal.2 This is the
most nebulous basis for the application of the doctrine. It can readily
be determined whether a particular question was raised on the first
appeal and there is no great obstacle in determining whether the court
had to decide a particular question in order to reach the result of the
first appeal, but it is far from certain whether or not the court would
have considered a particular question had it been urged. It should
be noticed that questions neither urged nor considered but which
were necessarily decided are considered apart from this class of ques-
tions. If it is to be assumed that the court would, were they presented,
decide only questions necessary to the disposition of the appeal, then
the two classes of questions are coextensive. The Washington court
has, however, given reason to believe that this is not so. There is a
18 Sutherland v. Friedenbloom (Tex. Civ. App.), 200 S.W. 1099 (1918).19 Manson v. Foltz, 170 Wash. 652, 17 P. 2d 616 (1932) ; Cox v. McLaughlin, 76
Cal. 60, 18 Pac. 100 (1888).20 Columbia Steel Co. v. State, 34 Wn. 2d 700, 209 P. 2d 482 (1949).2 1 Lustenberger v. Boston Casualty Co., 300 Mass. 130, 14 N.E. 2d 148, 115 A.L.R.
1055 (1938) ; Meyers v. Meyers, 214 Ark. 273, 216 S.W. 2d 54 (1948) ; E. F. Pritch-
ard Co. v. Heidelberg Brewing Co., 314 Ky. 100, 234 S.W. 2d 486 (1950) ; Lonnecker
v. Borris, 295 Mo. 453, 245 S.W. 2d 53 (1951).
19531
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
line of cases, as indicated above, which limit the doctrine to questions
actually presented and decided and questions necessarily involved.
There is another line of cases which indicate that the doctrine also
applies to questions which would have been determined on the first
appeal had they been presented.22 If this is an indication that the
court regards the two classes of questions as separate, then the results
of applying the doctrine to questions which would have been de-
termined had they been presented would be unfortunate. Since the
conclusion reached as to such questions would then be dictum on the
first appeal, there would be no objective basis for determining whether
or not a particular question would fall within that class. It is sub-
mitted that the doctrine cannot properly be applied to questions which
would have been determined had they been presented since this
application of the doctrine is either a restatement of the rule that
questions necessarily involved may not be reconsidered or it precludes
reconsideration of questions which do not provide a basis for that
result.
EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE IN SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS
Once it has been decided that a particular question falls within the
application of the law of the case doctrine, it is the general rule that
it will not be reconsidered in subsequent proceedings. An unfortunate
choice of language in a few of the cases conveys the impression that
the doctrine does not come into operation until the second appeal is
taken, and then only if the evidence introduced at the second trial
is substantially the same as that introduced at the first trial.2" The
doctrine does, however, apply to the trial court as well as to the
appellate court itself."' The law of the case, as established on the first
appeal, is binding upon the trial court. In one Washington case, the
trial court on remand of the case exceeded the directions of the apel-
late court in entering the judgment. The judgment was held to be
void to the extent that the trial court had exceeded the directions of
the appellate court.2" More recently, however, the Washington court
22 Bradley v. S. L. Savidge, Inc., 21 Wn. 2d 556, 152 P. 2d 149 (1944) ; Buob v.
Feenaughty Machinery Co., 4 Wn. 2d 276, 103 P. 2d 325 (1940) ; Manson v. Foltz,
170 Wash. 652, 17 P. 2d 616 (1932).
23 Cook v. Stimson Mill Co., 41 Wash. 314, 83 Pac. 419 (1906); Weyerhaeuser
Sales Co. v. State Tax Comm., 34 Wn. 2d 927, 209 P. 2d 490 (1949).
24 Bunn v. Bates, 36 Wn. 2d 100, 216 P. 2d 741 (1950).
25 State ex rel. Waterman v. Superior Court, 127 Wash. 37, 220 Pac. 5 (1923).
26 State ex rel. McBee v. Superior Court, 162 Wash. 695, 299 Pac. 383 (1931);
Golubic v. Rasnich, 249 Ky. 266, 60 S.W. 2d 616 (1933) ; Taylor v. Bunnell, 211 Cal.
601, 296 Pac. 288 (1931) ; Palazzolo v. Sackett, 254 Mich. 289, 236 N.W. 786 (1931);
Hagist v. Vogt (Tex. Civ. App.), 296 S.W. 985 (1927).
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has adopted what appears to, be the usual view that, although re-
versible error is thereby committed, the failure of the trial court to -
follow the decision of the appellate court does not render the judge-
ment void or invalid. The appropriate remedy is another appeal and
reversal."8
In the appellate court itself, questions within the doctrine will
usually not be reconsidered on a subsequent appeal. There are, how-
ever, three general exceptions to this rule: (1) A substantial change
in the facts at the second trial which renders a decision reached on
the first appeal no longer applicable will remove that decision from
the doctrine.2? However, a change in the evidence which is merely
cumulative will not free the case from the doctrine."' (2) If new
parties are involved, the decisions reached on the first appeal may
not be the law of the case as to them. The doctrine applies only to
parties involved in the first appeal and their privies.2 " (3) The third
exception to the doctrine arises where, between the first and second
appeals, another case has been decided in which the decision rendered
on the first appeal has been overruled. This situation was considered
by the Washington court in the case of Shell Oil Co. v. Henry."0 In the
intervening period between the two appeals, a similar case8 involving
the same questions was decided by the court contrary to the decision
rendered on the first appeal."' In the second Henry case, the court
refused to apply its earlier decision as the law of the case, holding,
". .if our former decision in this case . . is the law of the case, then
that law has been overruled by the Robinson case." The result in the
Henry case was reached without any review of authority and leads
to an anomolous situation when compared with the rules which the
court, as in the Gaffney case, has otherwise applied to erroneous
decisions. This decision indicates that the Washington court applies
the doctrine of the law of the case even to situations where the court
is convinced that its previous decision was wrong. There seems to be
no rational basis for the application of the doctrine to previous deci-
sions which are clearly erroneous except in the situation where the
purely fortuitous occurrence of an intervening appeal in a separate
case has enabled the court to overrule its previous decision.
27Schofield v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 13 Wn. 2d 18, 123 P 2d 755 (1942).
28 Kansas ex rel. Beck v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 95 F. 2d 935 (C.A. 10th 1938).
29 Kansas ex rel. Beck v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., supra, Its re Carother's Estate,
168 Cal. 691, 144 Pac. 957 (1914).30 Shell Oil Co. v. Henry, 175 Wash. 298, 27 P- 2d 582 (1933).
S'Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 172 Wash. 611, 21 P 2d 246 (1933).




The more recent Washington cases indicate that the doctrine of the
law of the case is as much a hard and fast rule modernly as it was in
the days of the earliest decisions of the court. It would be difficult to
find a more extreme application of the doctrine than that in the
Gaffney case. Some courts, however, have indicated a more liberal
attitude toward making exceptions to the doctrine where the circum-
stances of a particular case make that result desirable. The Supreme
Court of the United States, in comparing the doctrine of the law of
the case to that of res judicata has stated, "And although the latter
[res judicata] is a uniform rule, the 'law of the case' is only a discre-
tionary rule of practice."8 Earlier decisions of that court considered
the doctrine as a binding rule from which even the court itself could
not escape."4 Recent decisions of several state courts have adopted
the same approach to the application of the doctrine."5 In Alabama,
the law of the case doctrine has been abrogated by statute,"0 seemingly
without entangling the Alabama court in a mass of prolonged litigation.
Of course rules of procedure are necessary if an appellate court is
to operate efficiently; and it appears that a rule of procedure is quite
justifiable as long as it enables the court more efficiently to perform
its function of properly adjudicating disputes between litigants. So
much of the law of the case doctrine as finally puts at rest questions
which the court is convinced that it decided correctly on a previous
appeal seems to be a justifiable and desirable rule of procedure, but it
is submitted that the doctrine as it is applied in Gaffney v. Scott Pub-
lishing Co. is not justifiable as a procedural aid to proper adjudication
but is rather an instance of procedure for procedure's sake. The law
of the case doctrine should be abandoned where its application is to
force the court to perpetuate previous error. As long as the court con-
tinues to regard the doctrine as a binding rule from which there is no
escape, that result cannot be avoided. It is submitted that the more
33 United States v. United States Smelting, Refining, and Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186
(1950).
34 Peace v. Germania Ins. Co., 97 U.S. 362 (1877).
35 In re Reamer, 331 Pa. 117, 200 Atl. 35, 119 A.L.R. 589 (1938) ("rule of the law
of the case is one largely of convenience and public policy . . .it must be accommo-
dating to the needs of justice . . .") ; State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Ia. 1298, 31
N.W. 2d 853, 8 A.L.R. 2d 1162 (1948) ("the doctrine of 'law of the case' is not
invariably applied ... and should not be utilized to accomplish an obvious injustice") ;
Maxie v. Gulf, M. & 0. Ry. Co., 258 Mo. 1100, 219 S.W. 2d 322, 10 A.L.R. 2d 1273
(1949) ("[the doctrine is] not to be applied where manifest injustice to the parties
would result").30 Alabama Code 1940, Title 13 § 28.
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modern approach announced by the United States Supreme Court,
considering the doctrine as only "a discretionary rule of practice,"
should be adopted by the Supreme Court of Washington.
